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RETHINKING CANADIAN LEGAL
RESPONSES TO FROZEN EMBRYO
DISPUTES
Stefanie Carsley*
Abstract: This article examines and critiques Canadian legal
responses to disputes over frozen in vitro embryos. It argues
that current laws that provide spouses or partners with joint
control over the use and disposition of embryos created from
their genetic materials and that mandate the creation of
agreements setting out these parties’ intentions in the event of
a disagreement or divorce overlook the experiences of women
who undergo in vitro fertilization treatment. It also maintains
that these laws do not accord with how Canadian law and
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public policy has responded to similar conflicts between
spouses, or to agreements that seek to control or restrict
women’s reproductive choices. This article considers how
legislatures and courts in other jurisdictions have sought to
respond to embryo disposition disputes, but argues that their
respective approaches raise similar issues and would pose
additional problems within the Canadian context. It ultimately
provides recommendations for how Canadian laws might better
support the express objectives of the Assisted Human
Reproduction Act and Quebec’s Act Respecting Clinical and
Research Activities Relating to Assisted Procreation to protect
the health and well-being of women, to promote the principle of
free and informed consent and to recognize that women are
more directly affected than men by the use of assisted
reproductive technologies.
INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, the British Columbia Supreme Court was
faced with the first Canadian “custody” dispute over frozen
embryos. Like many Canadians who have difficulty
conceiving, Gregory and Juanita Nott turned to in vitro
fertilization (IVF) treatment in the hope of building their
family. They created embryos using their own ova and sperm
and Mrs. Nott successfully gave birth to two children.
Following treatment in 2004, the couple was left with four
embryos, which they jointly consented to freeze and store for
future reproductive use. Since then, however, Mr. and Mrs.
Nott’s relationship has become strained; they separated in 2011
and then sought to obtain a divorce. In July 2012, they received
notice that their fertility clinic was closing down and a request
that they jointly consent to their embryos being transferred to
another clinic for future storage. The couple had signed a
consent form, at the time of the embryos’ creation, saying that
should either party refuse to consent to the embryos being
transferred, the clinic would have authority to destroy them.
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Mrs. Nott readily agreed to the transfer as she wishes to use the
embryos in an attempt to have more children. Mr. Nott refused
to authorize the transfer, as he wants the embryos to be
destroyed. In December 2012, Mrs. Nott successfully obtained
an injunction to prevent the embryos’ destruction, until their
divorce trial can be heard and they can seek a judicial
determination regarding what should happen to their embryos.1
Media reports suggest that the case was to be heard in June
2013,2 but it is unclear whether it proceeded to trial. As of June
2014, a decision had yet to be released.3
This dispute arose in part as a result of section 8 of the
federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act4 (AHRA) and its
associated AHR Consent Regulations.5 This legislation requires
that spouses or common-law partners provide joint consent to
use or donate in vitro embryos created for their reproductive
use,6 and also allows one spouse or partner to unilaterally
1

See Keith Fraser, “Woman wins Round 1 in embryo fight; Judge says
they should be saved at least until couple’s divorce trial”, The
Province [Vancouver, B.C.] (6 December 2012) A6; Christopher
Reynolds & Pamela Fayerman, “B.C. woman wins some time in
‘custody’ battle over frozen embryos”, The Vancouver Sun (6
December 2012), online: The Vancouver Sun <http://www.vancouver
sun.com/>.

2

Ibid.

3

The British Columbia Supreme Court’s recorded entries for this file
are not available to the public, but as of June 8 2014 they continued to
indicate that the file was last modified on May 28 2013.

4

Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA].

5

Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) Regulations,
SOR/2007-137 [AHR Consent Regulations].

6

See AHRA, supra note 4, s 8(3) (which explains that embryos may
not be used without the donor’s consent); AHR Consent Regulations,
supra note 5, s 10(1) (which explain that a “donor” is the “individual
or individuals for whose reproductive use an in vitro embryo is
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withdraw his or her previously given consent, in writing,7 prior
to the embryos being used, thawed or designated for a specific
purpose.8 One effect of these laws is that where a couple, like
Mr. and Mrs. Nott, have created embryos from their own ova
and sperm in order to build their family,9 one party may change
created” and includes “the couple who are spouses or common-law
partners at the time the in vitro embryo is created, regardless of the
source of the human reproductive material used to create the
embryo”), s 10(2) (which requires compatible consent from a couple
for their consent to comply with the regulations) and s 13 (which
requires that prior to making use of an in vitro embryo, an individual
will have the written consent of the donor stating that the embryo
may be used for the donor’s own reproductive use, or may be donated
for third-party reproduction, for research or for instruction.)
7

See AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, s 14(3) (which allows
either spouse or partner to withdraw the donor’s consent) and s 14(1)
(which clearly stipulates that this withdrawal must be in writing).

8

The timing for revocation differs depending on whether consent was
given to use the embryos, or to donate them for third party
reproduction, for research or for instruction. In the case of consent
given to use the embryos for their own reproductive use, revocation
can only happen before implantation. In the case of donation for third
party reproductive use, withdrawal is only possible “before the third
party acknowledges in writing that the embryos have been designated
for their reproductive use.” In the case of donation for research or
instruction, withdrawal must happen before the embryos are thawed,
or a person acknowledges in writing that the embryos have been
designated for that purpose, or before the creation of a stem line,
whichever of these occurrences happens the latest. See AHR Consent
Regulations, supra note 5, s 14.

9

Where a same-sex or opposite-sex couple uses donated sperm or ova
to create embryos, this couple will similarly be considered the
“donor” and will be required to provide joint consent to their embryos
being used or donated while they are in a relationship. However, the
law also stipulates that if their relationship or marriage breaks down,
only the genetic contributor will be considered the “donor” under the
law and will have exclusive control over the embryos’ use or
disposition. AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, s 10(3).
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his or her mind and prevent the other from using these embryos
to have more children.10
This case has also come about because of uncertainty
under the law as to whether embryo disposition agreements or
consent forms are legally enforceable. While the AHRA states
that embryos cannot be used or donated without the consent of
both spouses,11 it does not clarify what will happen to a
couple’s surplus embryos in the event the parties cannot come
to an agreement and provide compatible consent. In other
words, it does not say whether the embryos would have to
remain in storage or could be destroyed. Quebec has sought to
address this issue through its Regulation Respecting Clinical
Activities Related to Assisted Procreation12 (Regulation
Respecting Assisted Procreation), which stipulates that where
embryos have been created but not used, spouses must express
their intentions in writing regarding what should happen to
their embryos in the event they disagree, one dies, their
relationship or marriage ends, or the woman for whom the
embryos were created is no longer of childbearing age or
10

This would mean, for instance, that a woman could not use the
embryos for her own IVF cycle, and that a man could not use them
with a new partner. It would also mean that neither spouse/partner
could use the embryos with a surrogate. According to her lawyers’
website, Mrs. Nott reportedly intended to argue that section 8 of the
AHRA is unconstitutional as it violates her right to life, liberty and
security of the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and is ultra vires federal jurisdiction. See
Family Law Blog, “BC and Frozen Embryo Dispute Lawyers”,
online: Maclean Law, < http://www.bcfamilylaw.ca/2012/12/05/bcand-canadian-frozen-embryo-family-dispute-lawyers/>

11

For the sake of simplicity, the remainder of this article will use the
language of “spouse” to denote both spouses and partners.

12

Regulation Respecting Clinical Activities Related to Assisted
Procreation, OC 644-2010, 7 July 2010, (2010) GOQ II, 2253, ss 1920 [Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation].
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physically able to use them.13 While not legally required
elsewhere in Canada, Canadian fertility clinics also ask their
13

Ibid, s 21; Assisted reproductive technologies are currently regulated
through federal and provincial legislation because this is an area of
divided jurisdiction. For instance, prohibitions on payment for
gametes, embryos and surrogacy fall within federal criminal law
power and are therefore regulated through the federal Assisted Human
Reproduction Act. See AHRA, supra note 4, ss 6-7; Other issues
relating to the regulation of assisted reproduction, such as the
collection and disclosure of donor information or determinations of
parentage, fall within provincial jurisdiction over hospitals, property
and civil rights and matters of a merely local nature. In 2007, the
Quebec government brought a reference before the Quebec Court of
Appeal arguing that the original version of the Assisted Human
Reproduction Act was unconstitutional as it impinged upon provincial
jurisdiction. See Procureur Général du Québec c Procureur Général
du Canada (Renvoi fait par le gouvernement du Québec en vertu de
la Loi sur les renvois à la Cour d’appel, L.R.Q. ch. R-23, relativement
à la constitutionnalité des articles 8 à 19, 40 à 53, 60, 61 et 68 de la
Loi sur la procréation assistée, L.C. 2004, ch.2) 2008 QCCA 1167,
[2008] JQ no 5489. The Quebec government was successful and the
decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. However,
before the SCC could render its decision, Quebec went ahead and
introduced its own legislation and regulations pertaining to assisted
procreation. On June 18 2009, the Quebec National Assembly passed
Bill 26, An Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Relating
to Assisted Procreation, 1st Sess, 39th Leg, and then in July 2010
adopted its associated Regulations. See An Act Respecting Clinical
and Research Activities Relating to Assisted Procreation, RSQ 2009,
c A-5.01 [Act Respecting Assisted Procreation] and Regulation
Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12. In a split decision,
the Supreme Court of Canada struck down parts of the AHRA as
being ultra vires federal jurisdiction but maintained those provisions
that it deemed to fall within the ambit of federal criminal law power.
Section 8 of the AHRA and its AHR Consent Regulations were
preserved and thus laws relating to disposition decisions between
spouses remained the same. See Reference Re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61. The effect of the SCC’s decision is
that currently there exists partial legislation regulating assisted
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clients to sign consent forms – prior to embryos being created
or frozen – indicating what should happen to embryos if the
parties can no longer provide compatible consent. If these
agreements are legally enforceable then they may enable
parties to contract around the right to revoke consent and allow
for embryos to be used for reproduction or be donated, even in
the event one spouse changes his or her mind. They may also,
however, provide that embryos will be destroyed, even if one
spouse, like Mrs. Nott, wishes to use them to have more
children.
This article examines these approaches towards
resolving disputes over surplus embryos and considers whether
they support the express objectives of the AHRA and Quebec’s
Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Relating to
Assisted Procreation (Act Respecting Assisted Procreation) to
protect the health and well-being of women, to promote the
principle of free and informed consent and to recognize that
women are more directly affected than men by the use of
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs).14 It suggests that
while Canadian governments and lawmakers have paid lip
service to these objectives, current laws seeking to regulate
embryo disposition disputes do not fully support these statutes’
expressed intentions in practice. Adopting a contract model or
allowing one individual to prevent his or her spouse or partner
from using embryos for procreation overlooks the experiences
of women who undergo in vitro fertilization treatment and also
does not accord with how Canadian law and public policy has
responded to similar conflicts between spouses, or to
agreements that seek to control or restrict women’s
reproductive choices. This article thus considers alternative
procreation in Canada and Canadian provinces are poised to follow
Quebec’s lead and introduce their own legislation.
14

AHRA, supra note 4 at ss 2(c), 2(d); Act Respecting Assisted
Procreation, supra note 13, s 1.
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means of responding to these disputes and ultimately provides
suggestions for law reform.
This piece focuses specifically on how Canadian laws
seek to regulate disputes where both spouses have used their
own ova and sperm to create embryos. Where same-sex or
opposite-sex couples use donated sperm or ova to conceive, the
law is quite different; should their relationship dissolve, the
spouse who was a genetic contributor will be given exclusive
control over these embryos.15 Although the latter situation
raises significant issues and is similarly vulnerable to
criticism,16 a thorough exploration of the problems associated
with this approach goes beyond the scope of this paper.17
This article’s analysis contributes to longstanding
debates within Canada regarding the merits and problems with
15

AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, s 10(3); For instance,
suppose Amy and Mary created embryos using Amy’s eggs and a
donor’s sperm with the intention that the embryos be used for Mary
to undergo IVF. In this case, should they divorce or separate prior to
the embryos being used, Amy will have control over the embryos’
use or disposition and may prevent Mary from using them.

16

For instance, these laws do not recognize that where a lesbian couple
creates embryos for their own reproductive use, they may agree that
one spouse will use her eggs while the other will undergo embryo
implantation. It is questionable whether in such a scenario it is fair to
allow the genetic contributor to have exclusive control. The spouse
who did not harvest her eggs may have decided not to do so on the
understanding that she would have children using her partner’s ova. It
is also possible that by the time of a dispute, the spouse who did not
use her eggs may no longer have viable ova. In turn, one might argue
that such an approach also ignores the financial contribution that
spouses may have jointly made to the embryos’ creation by paying
for IVF treatments or potentially paying for sperm outside of Canada.

17

It should be noted that in choosing this narrow focus, this paper does
not intend to suggest that it is important to reproduce biologically, or
that genetics ought to be privileged in determining who ought to be
considered a parent under Canadian law.
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allowing spouses to jointly control embryo disposition and sign
consent forms indicating their intentions.18 In doing so, it takes
into account the current state of Canadian law and public
policy, the growth of empirical research on IVF and the
development of increased case law relating to the disposition of
reproductive materials. It also builds upon Canadian
scholarship that has debated the benefits and risks of applying a
contract model in family law contexts,19 and which has
18

See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life? A Relational
Approach to Choosing Legal Categories” (1993) 6:2 Can JL & Jur
343; Michael Trebilcock et al, “Testing the Limits of Freedom of
Contract: The Commercialization of Reproductive Materials and
Services” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 613; Roxanne Mykitiuk &
Albert Wallrap, “Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada”
in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M Flood, eds,
Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Markham, Ont.:
Butterworths, 2002) 367; Christine Overall, “Frozen Embryos and
‘Fathers’ Rights’: Parenthood and Decision-Making in the
Cryopreservation of Embryos” in Joan C Callahan, ed, Reproduction,
Ethics and the Law: Feminist Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1995) 178. With the exception of Overall, none of
this scholarship considers the merits or problems with these
approaches in any detail but rather mentions them in passing. In
addition, with the exception of Mykitiuk’s piece from 2002, the rest
of this literature dates back to the early 1990s. There does not exist
any recent published scholarship on this topic; however, this article
cites to unpublished conference proceedings, recently prepared by
Angela Campbell for the National Judicial Institute, on section 8 of
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and the different ways in
which Canadian courts might seek to resolve disputes between
spouses over surplus embryos. Her piece does not, however, discuss
Quebec’s
legislation.
See
Angela
Campbell,
“Averting
Misconceptions: Judicial Analyses of Family Disputes over Stored
Embryos” in National Judicial Institute, Proceedings of the National
Judicial Institute Family Law Seminar (February 2012) at 4
[unpublished, on file with author].

19

See e.g. Michael J Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, “The Role of
Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective
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advocated for a more “women-centered” legal approach
towards the regulation of assisted procreation.20
Part I argues that enforcing agreements or consent
forms does not take into account studies and jurisprudence that
call into question whether parties are in a position to make
autonomous, informed decisions regarding embryo disposition
prior to undergoing IVF treatment. In addition, Canadian law
pertaining to domestic contracts, surrogacy and child adoption
resists treating agreements in these contexts the same as
binding commercial contracts because of similar concerns
about whether such agreements reflect free and informed
decision-making.
Part II argues that allowing one individual to prevent
his or her spouse from using their embryos for reproduction
ignores the ways in which women are especially affected by
the creation of embryos and disregards the costs of IVF. These
laws seem to provide Canadians with the equivalent of a right
not to procreate or parent, even though Canadian law relating
to abortion, adoption and parentage or filiation do not provide
similar rights, thus calling into question whether such rights
ought to exist in relation to IVF embryos.

(1991) 41 UTLJ 533; Wanda A Wiegers, “Economic Analysis of Law
and ‘Private Ordering’: A Feminist Critique” (1992) 42 UTLJ 170;
Marcia Neave, “Resolving the Dilemma of Difference: A Critique of
‘The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law’” (1994) 44 UTLJ 97.
20

See e.g. Rosemarie Tong, “Feminist Perspectives and Gestational
Motherhood: The Search for a Unified Legal Focus” in Joan C
Callahan, ed, Reproduction, Ethics, and the Law: Feminist
Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) 55;
Diana Majury, “Pre-conception Contracts: Giving the Mother the
Option” in Simon Rosenblum, Peter Findlay & Ed Broadbent, eds,
Debating Canada’s Future: Views from the Left (Toronto: James
Lorimer & Co, 1991) 197.
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Part III then explores alternative means of resolving
disputes over frozen embryos. It considers how legislatures and
courts in other jurisdictions21 have responded to conflicts
between spouses over embryo disposition and, in turn, how
Canadian courts have dealt with analogous situations involving
control over genetic material. These varied approaches raise
similar issues to the Canadian contractual or joint consent
models, and would also conflict with Canadian law and public
policy relating to reproductive rights and the noncommodification of reproductive materials.
This article concludes by providing recommendations
for how Canadian legislatures and courts might resolve
disputes between spouses over their surplus embryos, in a
manner that recognizes the experiences of individuals who
undergo IVF treatment and the ways in which women are
uniquely affected by assisted reproductive technologies.
Genetic contributors should be unable to prevent their spouses
from using embryos they have created for procreative purposes,
and in the event that the parties divorce or separate and both
wish to use them, a female spouse should be given priority in
light of the greater health risks and complications associated
with IVF for women than for men. Agreements between
spouses signed prior to a woman undergoing IVF ought to be
legally unenforceable. Moreover, some of the issues that arise
in relation to embryo disposition could be resolved by
providing for increased and mandatory counselling and by
clarifying the parental rights and obligations of men or women
who no longer wish for their spouse to use their frozen
embryos for procreation.22
21

The majority of existing case law dealing with disputes between
spouses over embryos is from the United States, but there have also
been cases in Israel and the United Kingdom.

22

One might argue that an additional means of resolving these
disposition issues would be to freeze a woman’s eggs rather than
embryos for future reproductive use and to thus avoid issues of joint

66

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 29, 2014]

EMBRYO DISPOSITION AGREEMENTS AND
CONSENT FORMS
While Canadian courts have yet to clarify whether agreements
between spouses or clinic consent forms are legally binding, it
is worth exploring the implications of adopting a contract
model in this context. On this approach, the decision parties
made prior to creating embryos would be binding, unless
spouses jointly agreed to update their consent form or
agreement at a later point in time. Thus if spouses had elected,
for instance, to donate their embryos for reproduction in the
event of a disagreement, they would be bound by this decision
even if, at a later date, one of the parties no longer finds this
option palatable. Importantly, their original choice would also
be enforced if one party still wishes to use the embryos for
reproduction. These agreements might also, however, allow
spouses or partners to potentially circumvent the AHRA and
AHR Consent Regulations, which require joint consent to use
or donate embryos.23 For instance, parties might have stipulated
in their agreement that if they disagree or divorce, one spouse
will be uniquely given control over the embryos, or a third
party, such as a judge or clinic, will be given authority to make
a decision. The only decisions that could not be binding would
control in the first place. In the future this may provide a viable way
to prevent these issues from arising. At the moment, however, while
egg freezing techniques are becoming increasingly sophisticated, this
procedure is still in its infancy. Embryo freezing remains common
practice because embryos are more resistant to freezing techniques
and are able to be thawed and implanted with a greater chance of
successful pregnancy than frozen eggs. See e.g. Alison Motluk,
“Growth of Egg Freezing Blurs ‘Experimental’ Label” (2011) 46
Nature 382; Karey Harwood, “Egg Freezing: A Breakthrough for
Reproductive Autonomy?” (2009) 23 Bioethics 39.
23

See Part II for a detailed discussion of these provisions regarding
joint consent.
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be those that would clearly violate Canadian law and public
policy.24
This contractual approach has long received support
from Canadian scholars, ethicists and physicians. Twenty years
ago, when Canadians were first debating how best to address
potential conflicts over frozen embryos, the governmentappointed Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies recommended that gamete providers be jointly
required to make decisions regarding the disposition of their
embryos prior to gametes being retrieved or embryos created,
and to indicate their preferences in consent forms that would be
binding for the clinic involved.25 Some Canadian scholars
similarly proposed that while it might be appropriate for the
Canadian government to establish a default for what would
happen to embryos in the event that the genetic contributors
divorce or die, Canadians ought to be able to contract around
this default using consent forms.26
Support for a clear-cut contractual approach is not
surprising. It was thought that enforcing agreements would
prevent disputes between spouses and litigation over embryo

24

For instance, parties could not agree that in the event they divorce,
the remaining embryos could be sold for reproductive use or research
and the proceeds be divided amongst the spouses; such an
arrangement would directly contravene the AHRA’s prohibitions on
buying and selling gametes. See AHRA, supra note 4, s 7. They also
clearly could not sign a binding agreement that in the event of a
disagreement between spouses, the female spouse would nonetheless
be forced to use the embryos for procreation as this too would violate
Canadian public policy relating to women’s reproductive autonomy.

25

Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed
with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Government
Services Canada, 1993) at 598.

26

See Trebilcock, supra note 18 at 691.
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disposition.27 In theory, using agreements to resolve disputes
would also mean that neither party would be forced to dispose
of their embryos in a manner that they had not previously
contemplated; spouses would have been aware precisely of
what would happen to their embryos should certain events arise
and couples would have been in a position to negotiate at that
time what they felt would be the most appropriate manner to
resolve any future disputes. The parties would be informed as
to their options, and would be free to refuse to consent to
treatment should they be unable to come to an agreement.
It is far from clear, however, that Canadians are in a
position to provide free and informed consent regarding
embryo disposition at the time these agreements and consent
forms are signed. As the number of individuals undergoing IVF
has grown over the last three decades, so has the social science
research available on the experiences of individuals undergoing
treatment and the decisions they make regarding their frozen
embryos. This literature demonstrates that many individuals
change their minds about whether they would like to use,
donate or destroy their surplus embryos following IVF
treatment and especially following the birth of a child. The lack
of mandatory counselling and legal advice for individuals
undergoing IVF in Canada may mean that spouses make
decisions without fully understanding the legal implications of
their choices. In turn, judicial decisions from Canada and
abroad also suggest that individuals, and especially women,
who make decisions regarding their embryos may be so eager
to begin the IVF process that they may not contemplate the
potential consequences of the agreements they are signing, or
may agree to a disposition option in order to appease their
spouse. The following section will consider each of these
concerns in turn.
Free and Informed Consent
27

See Proceed with Care, supra note 25 at 598.
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Change of Heart
Empirical research demonstrates that many patients change
their minds regarding what should happen to their extra
embryos following IVF and especially after successfully giving
birth to a child through these methods.28 A number of studies
have shown that while a substantial number of individuals or
couples indicated initially – pre-IVF treatment – that they
would be interested in donating their surplus embryos for thirdparty reproduction or research, the vast majority did not follow
through when asked again to make a decision following
treatment.29 For instance, in one American study 71% of
couples changed their preference regarding disposition between
the time the embryos were created and when they were asked
to make a final decision.30 A Canadian study demonstrates that
while most patients preferred to donate their embryos to
research prior to undergoing IVF, and indicated this preference
on their consent forms, many had a change of heart after
completing IVF and decided to discard them.31

28

See Eric Blyth et al, “Embryo Relinquishment for Family Building:
How Should it be Conceptualised?” (2011) 25:2 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam
260 at 266.

29

See e.g. Sheryl De Lacey, “Parent Identity and “Virtual” Children:
Why Patients Discard rather than Donate Unused Embryos” (2005)
20:6 Human Reproduction 1661 at 1661-1662 [De Lacey, “Parent
Identity”]; CR Newton et al, “Changes in Patient Preferences in the
Disposal of Cryopreserved Embryos” (2007) 22:12 Human
Reproduction 3124 [Newton, “Changes”].

30

See Susan C Klock, Sandra Sheinin & Ralph R Kazer, “The
Disposition of Unused Frozen Embryos” (2001) 345 N Engl J Med
69.

31

See Newton, “Changes”, supra note 29 at 3127.
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Some scholars have hypothesized that this change of
heart may be linked to individuals’ changing perceptions of
their embryos.32 Qualitative and quantitative research on IVF
and embryo donation suggests that patients’ perceptions of
their frozen embryos often shifts over time and is particularly
liable to change following IVF treatment.33 These studies
reveal that many women who successfully conceived using
IVF began to see their embryos as their potential children.34
For instance, one study recounted that of 75 women
interviewed who had undergone IVF, 90% viewed their
embryos as potential persons and as potential brothers or sisters
to their own children.35 Other research explains that couples
with in vitro embryos began to describe them as their “virtual
children.”36
Once individuals successfully conceived through IVF,
many expressed reluctance to donate what they perceived as

32

See Blyth, supra note 28 at 267.

33

See e.g. Robert D Nachtigall et al, “How Couples Who have
Undergone In Vitro Fertilization Decide what to do with Surplus
Embryos” (2009) 92 Fertility and Sterility 2094; Newton, “Changes”,
supra note 29.

34

See e.g. Robert D Nachtigall et al, “Parents’ Conceptualizations of
their Frozen Embryos Complicates the Disposition Decision” (2005)
84 Fertility and Sterility 431 at 433 [Nachtigall, “Parents’
Conceptualizations”]; Catherine A McMahon et al, “Mothers
Conceiving Through In Vitro Fertilization: Siblings, Setbacks and
Embryo Dilemmas After Five Years” (2000) 10 Repro Tech 131 at
133 [McMahon, “Mothers Conceiving”].

35

See McMahon, “Mothers Conceiving”, supra note 34 at 133.

36

See De Lacey, “Parent Identity”, supra note 29; Nachtigall, “Parents’
Conceptualizations” supra note 34 at 433; De Lacey clarifies,
however, that this view is distinct from the perception that embryos
are “unborn children” or are already lives from the moment of
conception. See De Lacey, “Parent Identity”, supra note 29 at 1667.
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their biological offspring or “children.”37 Some drew an
analogy to adoption, and explained that they could not bear the
thought of giving away their genetic kin.38 For instance, one
woman who changed her mind explained: “And I felt good
about that whole thing until the time came when I had to make
that decision and I found that [began weeping] … I couldn’t
donate them. I never thought about that [someone else having
my child] really.”39 Several respondents in other studies
explained that they could not conceive of their genetic
offspring living elsewhere and being raised by other parents.40
As one pointed out: “I feel guilty that I have five embryos in
storage and that I am unwilling to donate them. But I see the
embryos as my children, and them being raised by someone
else would be something I would never get over. I see it as like
adopting out one of my twins.”41 Another explained: “Having
my child living somewhere else is not acceptable. It’s not like

37

See De Lacey, “Parent Identity” supra note 29 at 1665; McMahon,
“Mothers Conceiving”, supra note 34 at 133.

38

See e.g. Maggie Kirkman, “Egg and Embryo Donation and the
Meaning of Motherhood” (2003) 38:2 Women and Health 1 at 10; De
Lacey, “Parent Identity”, supra note 29 at 1666; Sheryl De Lacey,
“Decisions For the Fate of Frozen Embryos: Fresh Insights into
Patients’ Thinking and Their Rationales for Donating or Discarding
Embryos” (2007) 22 Human Reproduction 1751 at 1754.

39

See De Lacey, “Parent Identity”, supra note 29 at 1664.

40

See e.g. Catherine A McMahon & Douglas M Saunders, “Attitudes of
Couples with Stored Frozen Embryos Toward Conditional Embryo
Donation” (2009) 91:1 Fertility and Sterility 140 at 144; Julianne
Zweifel et al, “Needs Assessment for those donating to stem cell
research” 88:3 (2007) Fertility and Sterility 560 at 562; Karin
Hammarberg & Leesa Tinney, “Deciding the Fate of Supernumerary
Frozen Embryos: A Survey of Couples’ Decisions and the Factors
Influencing their Choice” (2006) 86 Fertility and Sterility 86 at 90.

41

See McMahon & Saunders, supra note 40 at 144.
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I’m donating an egg. I’ve thought of this as well. It’s not like
my egg or P’s sperm. It’s our child.”42
As a result of these findings, researchers have
questioned whether individuals who are planning to use IVF in
attempt to build their families are in a position to make
informed decisions prior to undergoing treatment,43 and
whether such agreements ought to be legally binding.44 This
research, like all empirical studies, has some methodological
limitations and may not reflect the experiences of all
individuals who undergo IVF.45 However, this change in
decision-making following IVF treatment has been identified in
studies across different jurisdictions46 and, importantly for the
42

See McMahon, “Mothers Conceiving”, supra note 34 at 133.

43

See e.g. Brandon J Bankowski et al, “The Social Implications of
Embryo Cryopreservation” (2005) 84:4 Fertility and Sterility 823 at
827-828; AD Lyerly, “Decisional Conflict and the Disposition of
Frozen Embryos: Implications for Informed Consent” (2011) 26
Human Reproduction 646 at 650.

44

For a critique of using these consent forms in the United States see
Deborah L Forman, “Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic
Consent Forms are not the Answer” (2011) 24 J Am Acad
Matrimonial Law 57.

45

For instance, as is common with social science literature, these
studies acknowledge their limitations with respect to sample size,
potential biases, and other factors that might have influenced their
results. These limitations may be particularly prevalent with respect
to empirical research on assisted reproductive technologies; given the
secrecy that traditionally surrounded the use of ARTs, as well as the
criminalization of payment in return for reproductive materials in
Canada, many people may be unwilling to discuss their experiences,
and those who are keen to have their voices be heard might be those
who are predisposed to hold certain views.

46

See e.g. Blyth, supra note 28 (which summarizes findings across
different jurisdictions).
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purposes of this article, this trend has been studied and
identified in Canada as well.47
Counselling and Legal Advice
Canadians also may not be currently receiving adequate
information about the potential consequences of the consent
forms or agreements they are signing. Under the AHR Consent
Regulations, donors must be informed in writing about how
their embryos will be used, and the manner and period of time
in which they may withdraw their consent.48 In turn, Quebec’s
Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation specifies that a
physician or health professional must inform IVF patients
about the possibility that the number of embryos produced will
exceed their reproductive needs and the need to plan, along
with their spouse, as to how they should be disposed of.49
However, it is unclear how much time clinics or hospitals take
to explain their consent forms to patients, and also whether
patients are being provided with sufficient information about
these consent forms’ potential legal implications.
Counselling and legal advice for individuals who
create or donate embryos is not legally required, despite being
highly encouraged or required by some clinics, and will
increase the substantial costs already associated with IVF.50
Prior provisions of the AHRA had required that counselling
47

See Newton, “Changes”, supra note 29.

48

AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, s 12.

49

Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12, s 20(8).

50

With the exception of Quebec where IVF is covered. However, even
in the case of Quebec, while some clinics provide a complementary
counselling session this is not required. See Stefanie Carsley,
“Funding In Vitro Fertilization: Exploring the Health and Justice
Implications of Quebec’s Policy” (2012) 20:3 Health Law Review 15
at 24.
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services be made available to individuals donating reproductive
materials or in vitro embryos and that licensees ensure that
donors receive these services. However, in the Supreme Court
of Canada’s 2010 decision in Reference Re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act the Court struck down these provisions,
having found that they were ultra vires federal jurisdiction.51
Quebec’s Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation currently
states that physicians must inform patients about “the
availability of psychological support at the centre.”52 However,
in many cases patients will need to pay to receive this
counselling, which might discourage them from receiving
needed support.53
While clinics may purport to provide patients with
information about their legal rights and obligations with regard
to any surplus embryos, this information may be inadequate.
For instance, an Ottawa fertility clinic’s information pamphlet
indicates that the woman for whom the embryos were created
and any partner must “provide for disposition of any embryos
that are not used for the purpose of attempting to initiate a
pregnancy, in case of any subsequent change to [their] health or
marital status” and explains that donors have the right to
modify this choice at any point in the future by withdrawing
their consent in writing.54 However, this pamphlet does not
clarify that spouses would need to jointly decide to change their
decision. Thus, for instance, a woman who indicates on the
consent form that the embryos may be donated to a third-party
in the event that she and her spouse separate may not, in fact,
51

AHRA, supra note 4, s 14; Reference Re AHRA, supra note 13.

52

See Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12, s
20(12).

53

See Carsley, supra note 50 at 24.

54

Ottawa Fertility Centre, “Patient Information Kit: Freezing Human
Embryos
After
In
Vitro
Fertilization”
online:
<http://www.conceive.ca>.
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ever have the ability to change her mind, should her spouse
refuse to modify his consent. This clinic also explains that
“legal principles and requirements around embryo freezing
have not been firmly established” and that it is the “couple’s
responsibility to seek legal advice where legal ownership [of
the embryos] may be in question.”55
Pressure to Begin Treatment
Women who are eager to start the IVF process may also not be
in a position to fully contemplate the outcomes of signing these
agreements. Usually IVF represents a last attempt for oppositesex couples to have a genetic child. They turn to IVF after they
have already unsuccessfully attempted to conceive through
intercourse for over a year and often after they have already
tried other less invasive methods of assisted procreation, such
as artificial insemination. In addition, because a woman’s
chances of conceiving continue to decrease as she ages,56
women may feel pressure to undergo IVF as quickly as
possible, and may not be willing or feel able to take the time to
consider the implications of an embryo disposition agreement.
The case of Roman v. Roman demonstrates this
potential issue. The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld a clinic
consent form that allowed for a couple’s embryos to be
destroyed in the event of a disagreement. Mrs. Roman wished
to use them for reproduction, and had not yet had a chance to
undergo a first round of IVF, as her husband withdrew his
consent following the extraction and fertilization of her eggs,
on the night prior to her scheduled implantation. Mrs. Roman
testified that while she signed the agreement, “she would have
signed anything to move forward because her goal was to have
55

Ibid.

56

See e.g. James P Toner, “Age = Egg Quality, FSH Level = Egg
Quantity” (2003) 79:3 Fertility and Sterility 491.
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a child” and that she and her ex-husband never discussed the
prospect of divorce or what would happen to their embryos in
the event they should disagree.57
Donors might also understand the legal implications of
these consent forms but give in to their spouse or partner’s
requests or demands simply because they wish to begin the IVF
process. For instance, the decision of the British Columbia
Supreme Court in K.D. v. N.D. demonstrates that one spouse
may decide to sign an embryo disposition agreement that does
not reflect his or her wishes. In this case, a couple signed an
agreement prior to undergoing IVF that clarified that in the
event they should disagree or divorce, “custody” over the
embryos would be decided in court. While their clinic’s
standard consent form would have given Mrs. K.D. control
over the embryos, Mr. N.D. had revised the agreement without
consulting her and then asked for her signature. She complied,
even though she claimed that she was unhappy about the
modification.58 Their marriage deteriorated, and at the time of
divorce she initially sought an order that she be given control
over the embryos. However, by the time of the divorce trial the
parties had agreed that the embryos would be destroyed. Thus
the Court was not asked to determine the validity of their prior
agreement, but rather simply granted the order that Mr. N.D.
requested: that the embryos “be destroyed in a manner
acceptable to K.D.” and that she be required to provide proof
that the embryos have been destroyed.59 The Judge did not
inquire into the circumstances under which Mrs. K.D. signed
the original agreement, or question what caused her to change
her mind and give in to her ex-husband’s request to have the
embryos destroyed.
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Roman v Roman, 193 SW 3d 40 (2006) at 15 [Roman].
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KD v ND, 2009 BCSC 995 at para 17.
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Ibid at para 180.

Rethinking Canadian Legal Responses to Frozen Embryo
Disputes

77

The experiences of individuals and couples who
undergo in vitro fertilization combined with the potential lack
of counselling and legal advice for couples making embryo
disposition decisions, thus raises questions about whether
contracts signed prior to a woman undergoing IVF should be
given legal weight. If donors were unable to contemplate the
effects of these agreements or how they might later feel about
their decision, then they were not in a position to make
enlightened, informed choices regarding embryo disposition. It
is also not clear to what extent these consent forms or
agreements reflect the autonomous wishes of spouses. Given
that spouses need to decide, from the outset, as to how embryos
should be disposed of at a later date, if they disagree at the time
of the contract’s creation one spouse is likely to bend to the
wishes of the other in order to proceed with treatment. In light
of these circumstances, enforcing agreements may run directly
counter to the intentions of the AHRA and Quebec’s Regulation
Respecting Assisted Procreation to ensure that embryos are
only used or donated in circumstances where donors have
provided free and informed consent.60
Legally Enforceable Agreements
Canadian law and public policy resists applying a traditional
contract model to a variety of family law agreements, in part
because of concerns about whether parties are in a position, at
the time of these agreements’ creation, to provide free and
informed consent. For instance, while Canadian courts have
emphasized the importance of upholding domestic contracts
between spouses, these agreements may be potentially set-aside
in circumstances where an arm’s length commercial contract
would not be subject to judicial interference.61
60

AHRA, supra note 4, s 2(d); Regulation Respecting Assisted
Procreation, supra note 12, s 19.

61

For instance, in Miglin v Miglin, the Supreme Court of Canada made
clear that in assessing the weight to be given to an agreement that
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Canadian legislation and jurisprudence also
demonstrates that surrogacy contracts are not to be treated the
same as commercial agreements.62 For instance, Quebec,
Alberta and British Columbia’s family law legislation makes
clear that these agreements are not legally enforceable and do
not constitute valid consent to relinquish a child.63 In order for
limits spousal support under the Divorce Act, a court need not look
for “unconscionability” to set aside the agreement or modify its
intended outcome. See Miglin v Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 SCR
303 [Miglin]; See also Campbell, “Averting Misconceptions”, supra
note 18 at 17-18. Note, however, that in Miglin the Court decided to
uphold the agreement that was at issue and set quite a high threshold
for judicial intervention in domestic contracts. For commentary on
this case, see e.g. Carol J Rogerson, “They are Agreements
Nonetheless: Case Comment on Miglin v. Miglin” (2003) 20 Can J
Fam L 197.
62

Under a surrogacy agreement, a woman agrees – prior to conception
– to carry a baby for another couple and if the pregnancy is successful
to give up the child following the birth. Some of these agreements
may also set out the surrogate and intending parents’ mutual
expectations and aspirations with regard to the surrogate’s lifestyle
choices during pregnancy, doctors visits and the reimbursement of
her expenses. See e.g. Shireen Kashmeri, Unravelling Surrogacy in
Ontario, Canada: An Ethnographic Inquiry on the Influence of
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004) on Surrogacy
Contracts, Parentage Laws, and Gay Fatherhood (MA Thesis,
Concordia University, 2008) at 68 [unpublished].

63

Surrogacy agreements are “absolutely null” under article 541 of the
Civil Code of Québec. This reflects the view, unique to Quebec, that
even altruistic surrogate motherhood violates public order. See
Angela Campbell, “Law’s Suppositions about Surrogacy against the
Backdrop of Social Science” (2012) 43:1 Ottawa L Rev 29 at 50;
Civil Code of Québec, SQ 1991, c 64, art 541 [CCQ]; Alberta’s
Family Law Act similarly states that an agreement in which a
surrogate consents to relinquish a child to intending parents is not
enforceable, but may potentially provide evidence of intending
parents’ consent to parent a child born through surrogacy. Family
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intending parents to acquire parental rights to the exclusion of a
surrogate mother, a surrogate must consent to give up the child,
and her parental rights, following the child’s birth.64 Prior
jurisprudence also suggests that Canadian courts would be
unwilling to force a surrogate to give up a child against her
wishes, even in those provinces that do not have explicit
legislative provisions declaring that that surrogacy contracts are
unenforceable. Canadian courts have not yet needed to contend
with a custodial contest between a surrogate and intending
parents as the only Canadian surrogacy dispute was never
reported as going to trial.65 However, in cases where surrogates
Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 8.2(8) [Alberta FLA]; British
Columbia’s Family Law Act also states that an agreement “to act as a
surrogate or to surrender a child” does not constitute consent to give
up a child, but “may be used as evidence of the parties’ intentions
with respect to the child’s parentage if a dispute arises after the
child’s birth.” Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 29(6) [BC FLA]; It
should also be noted, however, that some scholars have suggested
that surrogacy agreements ought to be enforceable, despite these
laws. See e.g. Louise Langevin, “Réponse Jurisprudentielle à la
Pratique des Mères Porteuses au Québec; Une Difficile
Réconciliation” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 171.
64

Note however that in Quebec, a surrogate’s consent may not even be
sufficient. Intending parents are only able to receive legal recognition
by obtaining a special consent adoption under article 555 CCQ, and
case law has demonstrated that while some judges have been willing
to allow for these adoptions, others have not because this has been
viewed as circumventing article 541 CCQ which states that surrogacy
agreements are null and void. See CCQ supra note 63, arts 541, 555;
Adoption –091, 2009 QCCQ 628, [2009] RJQ 445 (where a judge
refused to allow for a special consent adoption, even where the birth
mother consented); But see Adoption — 09184, 2009 QCCQ 9058,
[2009] RJQ 2694, Adoption — 09367, 2009 QCCQ 16815, [2010]
RDF 387, and most recently, Adoption —1445, 2014 QCCA 1162
(where Quebec judges have been willing to allow intending parents to
adopt a child born through surrogacy).

65

W(HL) v T(JC), 2005 BCSC 1679.
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and intending parents agreed that the intending parents would
have sole custody, Canadian judges have nonetheless noted that
they were able to transfer parental rights to intending parents in
part because the surrogate consented, following the birth, to not
be considered the child’s legal parent.66
Canadian adoption law statutes also do not permit
women to provide binding consent to an adoption prior to
giving birth and also provide birth parents with a period of time
in which they may revoke their consent. Provincial statutes
across Canada make very clear that consent to adoption is only
valid if it is given in writing,67 following the birth of the child,
and often following a specific number of days stipulated in
each province’s adoption legislation. For example, British
Columbia’s Adoption Act clarifies that a birth mother’s consent
will only be valid if it is given at least ten days after the child’s
birth,68 whereas in Ontario birth parents’ consent may only be
given once the child is seven days old.69 A birth mother is also
given the opportunity to revoke her consent up to a certain
point after the child’s birth. For instance, in British Columbia
66

See e.g. R(J) v H(L), [2002] OJ No 3998 (where the court granted the
intending parents’ application to declare the gestational carrier not to
be the mother of the twins she carried, but where Justice Kiteley
noted that had the surrogate opposed this application, this could have
posed a problem); See WJQM v AMA, 2011 SKQB 317, 339 DLR
(4th) 759 (where the court noted that Mary, the surrogate mother,
“does not view herself as Sarah’s mother and supports the petitioners’
application to remove her name from that designation on Sarah’s
registration of live birth”).

67

Different provinces have different formalities for providing written
consent. For instance, British Columbia requires birth parents to fill
out certain forms. Adoption Regulation, BC Reg 291/96, s 9; Quebec
requires that consent be given in writing before two witnesses. CCQ,
supra note 63, art 548.

68

Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5, s 14 [BC Adoption Act].

69

Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C11, s 137(3) [CFSA].
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and Quebec the period of time for revocation is 30 days after
consent was given.70 In Ontario it is 21 days.71 If consent is
withdrawn during the revocation period, then the child must be
returned; however, if the period of time has elapsed, then the
child is to remain with his adoptive family, subject to some
exceptions.72 Any agreements, verbal or written, that were
created prior to these statutory time periods are not legally
binding.
In each of these contexts, the law recognizes that
agreements between spouses or between a pregnant woman and
third parties ought not to be treated the same as other contracts,
because of the nature of these agreements and the
circumstances in which they were created. The lower threshold
for judicial intervention in the context of domestic agreements,
as compared to commercial contracts, reflects the law’s
recognition that these agreements may be negotiated in
emotional circumstances and may reflect power imbalances
between spouses or partners.73 In the context of adoption and
surrogacy, Canadian laws recognize that a surrogate or a birth
mother may change her mind and wish to keep the child she
has carried following pregnancy and childbirth, and that where
a woman does give up a child, it should be in circumstances
where she has been given the time to reflect upon this decision
and is given the opportunity to make an informed and
autonomous decision. Laws relating to adoption and surrogate
motherhood also arguably reflect a desire under Canadian
public policy to protect women’s reproductive autonomy and to
70

CCQ, supra note 63, art 557; BC Adoption Act, supra note 68, s 19.

71

See CFSA, supra note 69, s 137(8).

72

For example, the Civil Code of Québec explains that if a birth parent
fails to revoke consent within 30 days he or she may nonetheless
apply to a court to have the child returned before the order of
placement. CCQ, supra note 63, art 558.

73

See e.g. Miglin, supra note 61 at paras 74-75.
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prevent the commercialization of reproduction.74 They seek to
preclude third parties from making decisions that will
determine whether a woman may raise the child she has carried
and to prevent children from being treated as commodities than
can be exchanged on the market.75 These laws also demonstrate
an intention to ensure that a child’s interests are given priority;
Canadian courts consider the best interest of the child in
determining who ought to be a child’s legal parents, regardless
of any existing agreements.76
These agreements are not entirely analogous to embryo
disposition agreements. Unlike marriage, cohabitation or
separation agreements, embryo disposition contracts or consent
forms do not deal with financial obligations, the distribution of
property or custody and access with regard to children.77
Canadian law makes clear that embryos are not “persons” and
thus are not children,78 and it would be inconsistent with the
74

See e.g. AHRA, supra note 4, s 6 (which prohibits commercial
surrogacy); BC Adoption Act, supra note 68, s 84 (which prohibits
giving or receiving payment for an adoption). See also Campbell,
“Law’s Suppositions”, supra note 63 at 48-51 (which explains that
some of the concerns driving the AHRA and the Civil Code of
Québec’s responses to surrogacy were related to the commodification
of human life, concerns about women’s reproductive autonomy and
informed consent).
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The issues associated with treating embryos as property are discussed
in more detail later on in this article.
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See e.g. Adoption —1445, supra note 64; WRL v CDG, [1994] MJ No
152; WW v XX, [2013] OJ No 600; MAC v MK, 2009 ONCJ 18,
[2009] OJ No 368.
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Note that marriage contracts and cohabitation agreements, however,
may not deal with custody and access. See e.g. Family Law Act, RSO
1990, c F3, s 52-53.

78

See e.g. Daigle v Tremblay, [1989] 2 SCR 530 [Daigle] (where the
Supreme Court held that a fetus is not a human being and thus does
not enjoy a “right to life” under Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights
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Assisted Human Reproduction Act, which prohibits the
commercialization of reproductive material,79 to treat embryos
the same as other property that may be negotiated for,
contracted over and bought and sold. Domestic agreements also
do not seek to make decisions that may ultimately determine
whether one party may be able to reproduce and raise a child.
In turn, unlike a surrogate or birth mother, a woman who
donates or destroys her embryos in accordance with a clinic
consent form or spousal agreement does not give up a child she
has carried and birthed.
However, embryo disposition agreements nonetheless
raise similar issues as domestic contracts, surrogacy contracts,
and adoption agreements. Agreements or consent forms setting
out spouses’ intentions regarding their embryos may also be
signed in emotional circumstances, and may not reflect both
parties’ wishes. Embryo donors, much like surrogates or birth
mothers, may change their minds regarding whether they
would like to donate their embryos – and thus give up an
opportunity to have and raise a child – after they experience
pregnancy and childbirth. In turn, embryo disposition
agreements, much like surrogacy contracts or adoption
and Freedoms); Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest
Area) v G(DF), [1997] 3 SCR 925 (which confirmed that a fetus or
unborn child is not a person who possesses legal rights under
common law). A fetus is defined as “a human organism during the
period of its development beginning on the fifty-seventh day
following fertilization or creation, excluding any time during which
its development has been suspended, and ending at birth.” AHRA,
supra note 4, s 3. An in vitro embryo is less developed as it is not
permitted to remain outside of a human body for longer than fourteen
days following fertilization or creation unless its development is
suspended through cryopreservation or vitrification. See AHRA, supra
note 4, s 5(d). Thus if a fetus is not a person, then by extension an
embryo also does not have legal personhood status.
79

AHRA, supra note 4, s 7.
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agreements, seek to restrict or control a woman’s ability to
reproduce or her choice to carry and/or raise her genetic
children, and thus are arguably problematic on grounds of
public policy.
This article contends that given these similarities,
embryo disposition agreements ought not to be treated the same
as binding contracts and should be legally unenforceable. The
threshold for judicial interference in relation to domestic
contracts seems too high for embryo disposition agreements
given that they involve decisions regarding women’s
reproduction. Moreover, much like surrogacy contracts or prebirth agreements to relinquish a child for adoption, these
contracts may be executed at a time when women do not have
sufficient information in order to make free and informed
decisions regarding the disposition of their embryos.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF JOINT CONSENT AND
CONTROL
Even if embryo disposition agreements are not treated as
legally binding, federal and Quebec provincial laws and
regulations would still apply to mandate that spouses have joint
control over these embryos and that one party may revoke his
or her consent prior to embryo implantation. Under section 8 of
the AHRA and its AHR Consent Regulations, if spouses used
their own genetic material in order to create embryos for
reproduction, these spouses are jointly considered the embryo
“donor” and their embryos cannot be used and cannot be
donated without their mutual consent, even if they divorce or
separate.80 If one spouse is unwilling to consent to use or
donate the couple’s surplus embryos, the embryos will either
have to remain in storage or can potentially be destroyed.
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AHRA, supra note 4, s 8(3); AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5,
ss 10(1), 10(2).
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What happens to these embryos if one spouse
withdraws his or her consent might depend upon whether
spouses are within or outside of Quebec. Quebec’s Regulation
Respecting Assisted Procreation has the added requirement that
spouses mutually consent to embryos being destroyed,81 and
also states that if both parties fail to make contact with a
fertility centre for over five years to re-express their intentions
regarding their embryos, the centre may dispose of them as it
wishes.82 Thus Quebec’s Regulation provides a default that
appears to contradict the AHRA’s provisions: Quebec clinics
are authorized to donate or destroy embryos even without
parties consenting to dispose of them in that manner.
What is most important for the purposes of this article,
however, is that in Quebec and across Canada, the AHRA’s
provisions regarding joint consent and unilateral revocation
may have the effect of preventing one spouse from using
embryos they have created for reproductive purposes. In the
Nott case discussed in the introduction to this paper, even if
Mr. and Mrs. Nott had not signed an agreement stating that
their embryos may be destroyed, Mrs. Nott would still be
unable to use the embryos to reproduce without her former
husband’s consent.

81

See Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12, s
19(3). It should be noted that the regulations do not use the term
“destroy”, but rather “dispose of” which might be thought to connote
donation as well as destruction; however, the French version uses the
language “élimination” suggesting that what they intended was
destruction.

82

Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12, s 24;
Quebec’s Regulation also requires that spouses must jointly contact a
centre once a year to re-express their intentions regarding the freezing
and storage of their embryos. See Regulation Respecting Assisted
Procreation, supra note 12, s 23.
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In addition, the AHRA also seems to enable a male
spouse, like Mr. Nott, to not only revoke his consent years after
the embryos’ creation, but also immediately after, providing he
withdraws his consent prior to the embryos being implanted.
Embryo implantation occurs 2-5 days after embryos are
created.83 It is thus possible – as is evidenced in jurisprudence
from the United States84 – for a male spouse to revoke his
consent midway through the first IVF cycle, after his spouse
has already undergone fertility treatment and ova extraction,
but just prior to implantation.
These laws providing spouses with joint control seem
to be based on the idea that as co-genetic contributors, men and
women ought to have an equal say in what becomes of their
embryos. It seems that in allowing one party to withdraw his or
her consent, these provisions also reflect the view that one
spouse should not be forced to procreate or be a parent against
his or her wishes.
This approach, much like the contractual approach
discussed in Part I, has received support as well as criticism
from Canadian scholars. For instance, Jennifer Nedelsky has
pointed out that allowing both partners to make decisions
regarding their embryos might be desirable because “we think a
sense of attachment and concern about the potential life one
shared in creating is appropriate” and because “we might well
judge that this sense of attachment should be honoured even in
the form of permitting one partner to refuse to allow the
potential life to develop into a child under circumstances over
83

See e.g. Manon Ceelen et al, “Growth and Development of Children
Born After In Vitro Fertilization” (2008) 90:5 Fertility and Sterility
1662 at 1662; Charles P Kindregan Jr & Maureen McBrien, Assisted
Reproductive Technology: A Lawyer’s Guide to Emerging Law and
Science, 2nd ed (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2011) at 92-93.
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which he or she could have no control.”85 Christine Overall,
Roxanne Mykitiuk and Albert Wallrap, however, have pointed
out that an approach which privileges joint control over
embryos does not recognize the potential power imbalances
between men and women and the fact that women undergo
invasive treatment in order to create their embryos.86
The following section takes up the latter position and
suggests that an approach that requires joint consent and which
allows for unilateral revocation does not adequately account for
the health effects of IVF, the biological differences between
men and women and the high costs of in vitro fertilization
treatment. These factors call into question the idea that men
and women ought to have joint control. While both parties may
have contributed genetically to the creation of embryos, their
contribution to the process of IVF is not equal and these laws
disproportionately disadvantage women.
Equitable Contribution and Effects?
Health Effects of IVF
Allowing a man to prevent a woman from using embryos for
reproduction ignores the health risks and effects women endure
as part of the IVF process. Women who undergo IVF subject
themselves to an invasive and risky procedure in order to
cultivate their limited number of ova to create embryos.87 They
85

See Nedelsky, supra note 18 at 361. She also points out: “A sense of
concern and responsibility for the future of the children one has
participated in bringing into the world may, however, be thought to
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See Overall, supra note 18 at 187-191; Mykitiuk & Wallrap, supra
note 18 at 415.
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18 at 187-191.
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are typically required to take hormone medication in order to
stimulate their ovaries to produce multiple oocytes. When the
ova are ready to be retrieved, a physician uses an ultrasound
probe to remove them, by directing a needle through the
vaginal wall into the ovarian follicles. The eggs that are
successfully retrieved are then fertilized in a Petri dish in order
to create embryos for implantation.88
Studies are mixed on the adverse health risks of IVF
for women, with some indicating that women undergoing IVF
treatment have an increased risk of blood clots, ectopic
pregnancies, preeclampsia and placental separation.89 It is
clear, however, that the fertility drugs used to stimulate
women’s ovaries may result in ovarian hyperstimulation
syndrome, which is estimated to affect between 1-10% of
women undergoing IVF treatment.90 This condition, in which
fertility medications cause patients to produce too many eggs,
is potentially life threatening.91
88
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The purpose of creating and freezing surplus embryos
is to reduce the number of times a woman will need to undergo
ovarian stimulation and egg cultivation procedures because of
the risks and discomfort associated with this process. Denying
a woman the ability to use these embryos frustrates these
intentions, as it would compel her to undergo an additional
round of unnecessary medical treatment, providing she is able
to physically or financially afford to undertake an additional
IVF cycle.
Biological Differences
Laws mandating that spouses provide joint consent to use their
embryos also do not recognize that because of biological
differences between men and women, a couple’s frozen
embryos may represent a woman’s best or only chance of
conceiving. In the absence of a medical condition, men can
continue to produce viable sperm at a much older age than
women can produce ova. Women’s eggs become less viable as
they age and thus women may be less likely to conceive using
newly created embryos, than ones that had been frozen
previously. Women also may be at higher risk of complications
if they retrieve their eggs at a later age, as they will be required
to take increased hormone medication to stimulate their
ovaries.92 Thus even if a woman is willing to undergo further
The Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, “Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome” (2008) 90 Fertility
and Sterility S188 at S189; Gelbaya, supra note 89 at 20; Madill,
supra note 90 at 285. See also Alison Motluk, “‘I thought I just had to
sleep it off’: Egg donor sues Toronto fertility doctor after suffering
stroke”, National Post (March 28 2013) A5.
92
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rounds of IVF because she is unable to use the embryos she has
in storage, she may no longer be able to use her own eggs
successfully in order to conceive. She would also, of course,
need to find a new partner or use donated sperm in order to
create new embryos for IVF.
While allowing either spouse to withdraw his or her
consent may affect both male and female spouses, overall these
laws are likely to have disproportionate effects on women.
Given the fact that men do not undergo invasive treatment to
create embryos and may also have a greater chance of
conceiving at an older age, it seems that they will be more
likely willing to revoke their consent than women.
Jurisprudence from within and outside of Canada supports this
theory. Among fourteen judicial decisions involving disputes
between spouses in Canada, the United States, the United
Kingdom and Israel, only one involved a case where a woman
withdrew her consent to use the embryos while her former
husband wanted to use them with a surrogate.93 This potential
power imbalance between male and female spouses thus
challenges potential justifications for joint consent grounded in
the idea that men and women equally contribute to the creation
of these embryos and thus should have an equal say in whether
they are used for procreative purposes.

Costs of IVF
Allowing one party to revoke his or her consent and requiring
that the embryos either remain in storage or be destroyed also
ignores the costs of IVF. Only Quebec currently provides
Cause Harm to Eggs”, The Guardian (4 July 2011) online: The
Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/>.
93

In Re Marriage of Nash, 150 Wash App 1029, 2009 WL 1514842
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publicly funded in vitro fertilization;94 in the remaining
provinces these services are a significant investment for many
couples and beyond the means of many Canadians. For
instance, one basic cycle costs approximately $6,000 plus
anywhere between $2,500-7,000 for medications.95 Given the
relatively low success rate of IVF,96 many couples will also
need to undergo more than one cycle in order to potentially
conceive. As a result, if one spouse withdraws his or her
consent and the other spouse still wishes to have more children,
that spouse may be unable to afford further rounds of in vitro
treatment.
In addition, where one spouse withdraws his or her
consent, this may also result in added costs and expenses. For
instance, if a woman is required to use donated eggs and/or
sperm because her partner has revoked his consent, this will
94

See Carsley, supra note 50; The Ontario government announced in
April 2014 that it would fund one cycle of in-vitro fertilization;
however, it has yet to be seen whether it will deliver on this promise.
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Post
(9
April
2014),
online:
The
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Post
<http://news.nationalpost.com/>. It should also be noted that at the
time of editing this article in 2014, the Quebec government was
discussing abolishing or restricting its funding for IVF. See e.g.
Amélie Daoust-Boisvert, “Inquiétudes devant la fin possible de la
gratuité” Le Devoir (25 Juin 2014), online: <http://m.ledevoir.com/>.
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Fertility and Andrology Society <http://www.cfas.ca>.
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increase the costs associated with these treatments. IVF clinics
charge increased fees for using donated genetic material,97 and
while Canada has banned payment for sperm and eggs,
individuals who need to use donations often turn to the United
States to purchase gametes, as the restrictions on payment in
Canada has resulted in a shortage of donors.98 In turn, storing
in vitro embryos also costs several hundred dollars per year.99
Thus if the AHRA mandates that embryos remain in storage
until a couple can come to a decision, this too can lead to
further costs, as well as conflicts between spouses regarding
who ought to be paying for these storage fees.
Revoking Consent to Procreate or Parent
In other contexts where there may be conflicts between spouses
with regard to one party’s desire to procreate or be a parent,
Canadian law has acknowledged power imbalances between
men and women and has refused to recognize a right not to
procreate or parent. Currently under Canadian law a man does
not have a legal right to revoke his consent to procreate where
a child is conceived through intercourse. In other words, he
cannot legally prevent a woman from giving birth to a child
conceived from his genetic material, even should he not wish,
or have never intended, to have genetic offspring. Canadian
jurisprudence makes explicit that a woman’s decision to have
97
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an abortion is hers alone to make and that she cannot be
compelled by the potential child’s father to abort a fetus or,
conversely, to carry the child to term,100 because to do so
would interfere with her bodily integrity and reproductive
choices.
In addition, once a child is born, a man typically does
not have a right to avoid legal parenthood where he has a
genetic connection to the child, even if he did not intend to be a
parent. An exception may exist if he can prove that he and the
child’s parent(s) had intended for him to be considered a donor
under the law,101 or that he had not consented to his spouse or
partner using assisted procreation to conceive a child.102 This
ability to potentially avoid being considered a parent under the
law, however, is only set out in some provincial family law
legislation.103
A man also cannot avoid these parental obligations by
forcing a birth mother to give up a child for adoption. Birth
parents are required to jointly consent to an adoption, unless a
birth parent is not found to have parental status or the capacity
to consent.104 However, where birth parents disagree and one
does not provide consent, the effect will be that the dissenting
parent will be able to keep the child. In other words, should the
birth father want to relinquish the child for adoption and the
100
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birth mother would like to keep the child, he will not be able to
override her wishes – and he will also be liable to pay child
support. The same would be true in the reverse situation where
the birth mother wishes to give up the child and the birth father
does not; he too will not be denied the ability to be a parent.105
These laws relating to abortion, adoption and parentage
recognize and seek to address the potential power imbalances
between men and women in relation to reproduction. Laws that
support a woman’s right to choose whether or not to have a
baby once pregnant, and which deny a man a say in whether a
child is born through his genetic material, recognize that
women should have control over their bodies and should not be
forced to undergo medical interventions against their wishes.
Provincial legislation relating to parentage and adoption is
intended to serve the best interests of the child,106 but also to
protect birth mothers from being pressured to give up a child
against their wishes, or from raising a child alone where this
was not their intention.
There are important legal and social differences
between the status of an in vitro embryo, an implanted embryo
or fetus and a child once born. An in vitro embryo does not
have personhood status,107 and has not yet been implanted in a
woman’s womb. Thus an embryo does not have legal rights
105
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and also does not present legal responsibilities for a child’s
mother, unlike a child who is born alive and viable.108 Because
in vitro embryos have not yet been implanted, should a man
revoke his consent to use an embryo, a woman will not be
required to undergo an abortion. Moreover, currently in
Canada, frozen embryos may remain in storage indefinitely,
and may be used years and even decades after they were
originally frozen.109 Embryos may also – unlike a baby – be
destroyed or donated to research. As a result, one might argue
that, within the context of embryo disposition decisions, it
makes sense for a man to be able to revoke his consent to
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procreate and for the law to recognize an interest in not being
forced to procreate against one’s will.110
Yet, despite these differences, similar power dynamics
exist in the context of embryo disposition, and are exacerbated
by Canadian laws allowing a man to revoke his consent for
embryos to be used for reproduction. While an embryo donor is
not pregnant, she has already undergone invasive and risky
medical interventions to create these embryos. As discussed
previously, she will also be required to undergo further rounds
of treatment should she want to create more embryos in an
attempt to conceive. It is thus questionable whether the fact that
the embryos are not yet implanted should justify a man’s
ability to override his spouse’s desire to use the embryos for
reproduction. Allowing a man to revoke his consent is
nonetheless enabling him to interfere with a woman’s body and
reproductive choices.
In addition, it also seems fair to question whether the
fact that embryos are frozen in time should make a difference
with regard to whether an individual will be found to have
parental obligations. Both individuals did, at one time, consent
to their genetic material being used in attempt to reproduce and
both intended to be parents. If they had not, the embryos would
never have been created, and if the embryos had been
implanted and resulted in childbirth, both would have been
parents under the law. It seems problematic that a man can
revoke his consent where he had previously expressed a clear
110
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intention to be a parent and where a woman elected to undergo
IVF based on the understanding that her spouse or partner
would be equally responsible for supporting any children
produced. Given that laws in relation to abortion, adoption and
parentage recognize the power imbalances between men and
women with regard to reproduction, arguably the law should
not be ignoring the ways in which women might be similarly
vulnerable where they have created embryos for IVF, and also
should not be serving to exacerbate this vulnerability by
allowing a man to revoke his previously given consent to
procreate and to be a parent under the law.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EMBRYO
DISPOSITION
In light of the weaknesses identified with current Canadian
legal approaches to disputes over frozen embryos, this article
contends that these laws ought to be modified to better account
for the experiences of individuals who undergo in vitro
fertilization. This Part considers other existing approaches for
dealing with disputes between spouses. It explores how judges
and legislators in other jurisdictions have sought to respond to
these disputes. It also examines how Canadian courts have
previously responded to related conflicts between spouses over
donated sperm, or between an embryo’s genetic contributors
where the parties were not spouses. It suggests, however, that
each of these models fails to adequately address the issues
discussed in Parts I and II of this article and that each of these
alternative approaches would also conflict with Canadian law
and public policy relating to assisted procreation.

Right Not to Procreate
A major trend in judicial decisions in the United States has
been to enforce consent forms or contracts between spouses,
unless these agreements would force one party to procreate
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against their wishes. In other words, courts have been willing
to uphold agreements mandating that embryos be destroyed in
the event the parties disagree or divorce. However, they have
been generally unwilling to enforce agreements that will allow
for an embryo to be used for procreative purposes in the event
one party changes his or her mind, on the grounds that this
“forced procreation” would violate public policy. For example,
in Kass v. Kass, the Supreme Court of New York upheld an
agreement that a couple’s surplus embryos would be donated to
research, despite Mrs. Kass’ wish, at the time of the divorce, to
use the embryos to have more children.111 In Litowitz v.
Litowitz, the Supreme Court of Washington similarly enforced
an agreement that allowed a clinic to destroy a couple’s unused
embryos despite Mrs. Litowitz’s desire to use the embryos for
reproduction using a surrogate.112 However, in A.Z. v. B.Z. the
Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to enforce an agreement
that said that if the couple separated, the embryos would be
given to one spouse for implantation. It found that doing so
would run counter to public policy, as it would mean forcing
one individual to procreate against his or her wishes.113 J.B. v.
M.B. involved an alleged oral agreement, corroborated by the
husband’s family, that surplus embryos would be donated to
third-parties for reproductive use, as well as a written
agreement allowing a court to make a determination as to who
should have control over the embryos in the event the parties
divorce. The husband wanted the embryos to be donated to
infertile couples, while the wife did not want them to be used
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by anyone for procreative purposes.114 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the wife’s right not to procreate
outweighed the husband’s right to procreate and that a contract
to reproduce is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.115 In
re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, the Court of Appeals of
Oregon enforced an agreement, which stipulated that in the
event the parties divorced the wife would be given control over
the embryos. The wife wanted the embryos to be destroyed,
while the husband wanted to donate them for third-party
reproductive use. In deciding that they could be destroyed, the
court was privileging the wife’s right not to procreate, and thus
not to have genetic offspring out in the world, even if they were
to be born to another couple.116
This trend in United States jurisprudence is effectively
a combination of the contractual approach and the joint consent
approach discussed in the first two parts of this article and is
vulnerable to the same criticisms developed there. It allows for
contracts to be recognized and enforced providing they allow
for embryos to be destroyed, donated to research or kept in
storage. However, it does not allow for parties to contract
around the requirement that both spouses agree to use the
embryos for procreation or donate them for third-party
reproduction. This approach fails to take account of the power
imbalances that can arise within spousal relationships and
women’s unique contribution to the creation of the embryos.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has taken a slightly
different approach towards supporting a right not to procreate.
In Re Marriage of Witten, a couple had signed an agreement
stating that their embryos will only be used with their mutual
114
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consent. Upon divorce, Mrs. Witten asked that she be given
control over the embryos and expressed that she did not want
them to be destroyed or given to another couple. Mr. Witten
was opposed to them being used by Mrs. Witten for
reproduction and requested an injunction preventing them from
being transferred, released or used without his consent. The
Court adopted what has been referred to as the
“contemporaneous mutual consent approach” and found that
the embryos would have to remain in storage unless the couple
could come to an agreement as to how they would be used or
disposed of.117 This approach is thus very similar to the “joint
consent” approach set out in section 8 of the AHRA, except that
in Canada it is still unclear whether parties may contract
around this approach, and whether embryos may be legally
destroyed where parties disagree.
Some courts have, in turn, tempered the right not to
procreate by making an exception where the party who wishes
to use the embryos would not otherwise be able to conceive.
For instance in Davis v. Davis, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee explained that in the absence of an agreement
between spouses, courts should give priority to the party who
does not wish to procreate, unless the other spouse will not
otherwise have a reasonable means of becoming a parent.118 In
117
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Nahmani v. Nahmani the Supreme Court of Israel relied upon
public policy to support a woman’s “right to reproduce.” It
found that in this case using the embryos represented Mrs.
Nahmani’s only chance to achieve biological parenthood and
that her claim should supersede that of her former husband not
to reproduce.119 In Re Marriage of Nash, the Court of Appeals
of Washington upheld the trial judge’s decision to award
control over the embryos to Mr. Nash who wished to use the
embryos with a surrogate to have more children. The trial judge
had been granted authority to decide who would control the
embryos in the event of a disagreement, and decided in favour
of Mr. Nash as it found that the “husband’s alternatives to
achieve parenthood are not reasonable as it would require him
to restart the expensive process [of IVF] and the success of the
process is questionable due to his age.”120 Most recently in
Reber v. Reiss, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania awarded
embryos to Ms. Reiss because she and Mr. Reber had not
signed an agreement prior to undergoing IVF, and because
using the embryos likely represented her only or best means of
procreating, given her treatment for breast cancer.121
This approach towards resolving disputes is certainly
preferable to the aforementioned contractual, joint consent or
strict “right not to procreate” models. It acknowledges the
potential unjust outcomes of allowing one party to unilaterally
revoke his or her consent, such as the particular effects this
may have on women, the costs of IVF, and the fact that without
using the embryos some individuals will be unable to otherwise
have children because of biological factors that are beyond
their control. However, this approach does not seem to go far
enough. Just because a man or woman might have the ability to
119
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create new embryos on account of their age, physical or
financial situation, does not justify allowing existing embryos
to be destroyed. The standard for “unreasonableness” in
jurisprudence from the United States seems too high; it does
not recognize that a woman will still be required to undergo
further rounds of invasive and risky egg retrieval procedures
should she wish to use IVF to have more children. In addition,
the Nahmani decision is based on the idea that in certain
circumstances a woman has a legal “right to reproduce.” This
judicial decision was based upon Jewish law as well as the idea
that public policy in Israel supports encouraging reproduction
and parenthood as beneficial for Israeli society.122 It has been
suggested that a similar “right to reproduce” might exist in
other jurisdictions;123 however, to date this right has yet to be
recognized under Canadian law, and at least one Canadian
scholar has pointed out the problems associated with
recognizing such a right in the Canadian context.124
Automatic Destruction if Revocation
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act of 1990 (HFEA) mandates that in the event
one spouse revokes his or her consent, embryos must be
destroyed.125 Thus even if one spouse has no alternative means
of reproducing for physical or other reasons, the other spouse
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may veto his or her ability to use embryos for reproduction as
the parties are given joint control over these embryos’
disposition. This approach is similar to the Canadian model
under the AHRA and Quebec’s Regulation Respecting Assisted
Procreation, except that it makes clear that embryos must be
destroyed, even if one party seeks to use them for procreation.
Recall that under Canadian law it is not entirely clear what
should happen to the embryos in the event of a dispute and if
agreements are not enforceable. They may need to remain in
storage until the parties can agree, and this seems to necessarily
be the case in Quebec where its regulations indicate that both
parties must consent for embryos to be destroyed.126
Having a “default” of destruction might be a desirable
solution in the event spouses cannot agree on how their
embryos should be disposed of and neither wants to use them
for reproduction. However, allowing for this default even
where one individual still wishes to use the embryos for
procreation is problematic for the same reasons outlined in Part
II of this article.
The potential injustice of this approach is perhaps best
illustrated by Evans v. United Kingdom.127 In this case, Evans
and her spouse discovered that she had pre-cancerous tumors
on her ovaries during preliminary IVF testing. Her eggs were
then harvested, and fertilized using her husband’s sperm and
she subsequently had her ovaries removed. However, prior to
using the embryos for implantation, the couple’s relationship
deteriorated and her spouse withdrew his consent to store the
embryos. Under the HFEA their clinic was required to destroy
the embryos, thus Evans sought an injunction to prevent their
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destruction. The trial court and Court of Appeal dismissed her
claim,128 the House of Lords refused her leave to appeal;
therefore, she appealed to the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). The ECHR ultimately upheld the validity of the
HFEA and found that there was no violation of her rights under
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.129 She was thus unable to use the
embryos she had created even though it was clear that she
would have no other way of conceiving. She had already
decided to have her ovaries removed, based on the
understanding that she would be able to use the embryos in an
attempt to build her family.130
Property Approach
An additional approach, which derives inspiration from some
recent judicial decisions in Canada, would be to treat the
embryos as property. Under this model, a court could divide
the embryos among divorcing spouses for them to do with
them as they wish or give them to one spouse to the exclusion
of the other. A court’s determination could be based on the
financial value of these embryos and whether one or both
parties had borne the costs of creating them. Thus for instance,
if a man had paid for IVF treatments as well as for the
embryos’ storage, his female spouse would be able to use them
even if he disagrees, but in return the division of their property
and assets would reflect the fact that he had paid for these
treatments. In other words, she would be required to
compensate him for the costs IVF and storage.
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While Canadian courts have yet to make a
determination as to what should happen to embryos in the
event of a dispute between spouses, they have seen one dispute
between partners over frozen sperm vials131 and one dispute
between genetic contributors – who were not spouses – over
the control of frozen embryos.132 These cases took a similar
approach in characterizing reproductive materials as property
and basing their analysis, in part, on the financial value of this
genetic material.
In C.C. v. A.W., the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
was asked to determine whether a woman could have access to
embryos without the consent of the male genetic contributor.
Mr. A.W., a friend and former boyfriend of Ms. C.C., provided
her with sperm to use for in vitro fertilization. C.C. underwent
IVF, successfully became pregnant and gave birth to twins.
Four embryos were frozen and placed in storage, for which
C.C. paid an annual storage fee. C.C. later sought to use the
embryos for further IVF cycles but A.W. refused to consent to
their release.133 The court held that A.W.’s sperm was “an
unqualified gift given in order to conceive children” and that
“the remaining fertilized embryos remain her property [and]
are chattels that can be used as she sees fit.”134 It emphasized
the fact that A.W. knew that his sperm would be used for
reproductive purposes, and that C.C. had paid for the embryos’
storage.135
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Some commentators have suggested that the C.C. v.
A.W. decision may be of limited authoritative value as it was
decided in 2004 and thus before the AHRA came into force.136
Others have pointed out that it was nonetheless decided
following the introduction of the AHRA in 2004, and may run
counter to it, given that this decision permits the use of
embryos despite one of the “donors” revoking his consent.137
These scholars have neglected to mention, however, that if this
case had been decided today the AHR Consent Regulations,
which came into force in 2007, would apply and it would have
been unnecessary to determine that the embryos were C.C.’s
property.138 Under these Regulations she would have been
considered the sole donor of the embryos, as A.W. was not her
spouse or partner at the time of the embryos’ creation. Thus,
only her consent would have been required in order for her to
use or dispose of the embryos.139 This case is thus only of
limited authority in determining whether one spouse or partner
should be able to override the other’s desire to use embryos for
reproductive use. However, it indicates one court’s willingness
to characterize embryos as “property” and thus to potentially
enable them to be divided among divorcing spouses.
Similarly, while J.C.M. v. A.N.A. dealt with a dispute
over gametes rather than embryos, it demonstrates that
Canadian courts have been willing to treat reproductive
material as property. The British Columbia Supreme Court held
that frozen sperm vials that had been purchased in the United
States could be treated as property, and thus could be divided
136
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among lesbian partners who had decided to separate.140 The
court also decided that since there was an uneven number of
sperm straws, J.C.M. should pay A.N.A. for the additional
sperm straw she received, and that A.N.A. could sell the
remaining straws to J.C.M. if she wished to do so.141
Intuitively, this approach might seem like a better
solution than the aforementioned models. It provides women
with the possibility of using embryos even without their
spouse’s consent and even where it is not the case that using
these embryos would be their only chance of conceiving.
However, this approach would contravene the express
provisions and spirit of the AHRA. Section 7 of the AHRA
criminalizes buying and selling gametes and embryos as it
seeks to ensure that individuals who donate their reproductive
material are doing so voluntarily and are not induced to donate
simply because of the prospect of financial gain.142 While
under this model embryos would not necessarily be sold to
third parties, they could nonetheless be exchanged between
spouses in return for financial compensation, which would still
contravene the AHRA’s intentions to prevent the
commodification of reproductive materials and services.143
Treating embryos as property – whether as true
property which may be exchanged for commercial value, or as
quasi property that may be controlled by spouses but not traded
on the market144 – also objectifies women’s bodies,
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reproductive capacities, and genetic material.145 The AHRA
makes clear that embryos and gametes are not to be treated like
other property, and the research restrictions it places upon
embryos are also based on the idea that as potential human life
these embryos ought to be accorded a certain measure of
respect.146 A property model would serve to undermine these
intentions.
In addition, endorsing a property approach could result
in these embryos being used as a negotiation tool in
acrimonious divorces. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in
which one individual uses his or her spouse’s desire to have
more children as a means of getting more than their equitable
share of their property and assets. Most case law that has
involved disputes over gametes or embryos has occurred upon
divorce. It is not clear whether disagreements over genetic
material led to these divorces, or whether divorces led to these
conflicts, but it does not seem far-fetched to suggest that
treating embryos as property may allow these embryos to be an
additional “commodity” that spouses compete over. Treating
embryos as property might also spark disputes upon marital
dissolution where otherwise there would have been no discord,
precisely because these embryos may be viewed as invaluable
to a spouse who seeks to have more children and thus
potentially more important than their financial assets.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW REFORM
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This article has demonstrated that current Canadian legal
responses to embryo disposition disputes do not adequately
support the objectives of the AHRA and Quebec’s Act
Respecting Assisted Procreation. Enforcing embryo disposition
agreements or consent forms would not take account of the fact
that individuals may not be in a position at the time of these
agreements’ creation and signing to make free and informed
decisions regarding the disposition of any surplus embryos.
This approach would also have the effect of treating embryo
disposition agreements as binding contracts, even though
Canadian law and policy refuses to treat domestic agreements
between spouses, or contracts relating to adoption or surrogacy
the same as commercial contracts. Allowing one genetic
contributor to prevent his or her spouse from using embryos for
procreation ignores the costs of IVF and the ways in which
women are disproportionately affected by ART treatment and
by laws preventing them from using their frozen embryos. This
response also enables a man to revoke his consent to procreate
and to be a parent, even though Canadian law in relation to
abortion, adoption and the parentage of children conceived
through intercourse and assisted procreation, deny men these
rights in response to the fact that women are more affected than
men by reproduction and may be vulnerable to men revoking
their consent to parent.
Other existing methods for dealing with embryo
disputes raise similar issues and pose additional problems.
Allowing for a right not to procreate, even with an exception
for individuals who cannot otherwise conceive, and providing
for automatic destruction in the event of a disagreement raise
the same issues as current Canadian responses. Adopting a
property approach conflicts with Canadian public policy, which
seeks to counter the commodification of reproductive
materials. It seems therefore that a novel approach is warranted
for dealing with these disputes within the Canadian context.
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One suggestion for law reform is that an individual
who wishes to use embryos for procreative purposes ought to
be able to do so, even if his or her spouse or partner disagrees.
In other words, a male donor should be unable to prevent a
female donor from using embryos for reproductive purposes
and a woman should not be permitted to prevent her male
spouse from using embryos with a surrogate or new partner.
This mutual inability to block the use of embryos for
procreation would recognize the considerable costs associated
with creating and freezing embryos for IVF, as well as the fact
that men and women might be otherwise unable to reproduce
without the use of these embryos. However, where male and
female donors each wish to use their embryos for reproductive
purposes, the woman should be given preference to use them,
in recognition of the greater physical contribution that she
made in harvesting her eggs, and the biological reality that
women’s ova become less viable as they age. This approach
would also be preferable to dividing them equally between
spouses, as allowing for this division could communicate a
message that embryos can be treated like property.
Although it has been argued in some foreign
jurisprudence that it is contrary to public policy to force one
spouse to procreate against his or her will, this argument is
exaggerated. The stronger argument is that forcing individuals
to destroy their embryos or donate them against their wishes
runs counter to Canadian law and public policy. As was
discussed in Part II of this article, while men and women may
bear the costs of ART treatment and may need to use IVF in
order to conceive, women are affected more than men by the
IVF process and because of biological differences may have
more difficulty conceiving at an older age than men. Canadian
law and public policy has recognized women’s
disproportionate contribution in the context of laws relating to
abortion. Moreover, the AHRA and Quebec’s Act Respecting
Assisted Procreation make clear that their provisions are
intended to recognize the power imbalance between men and
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women who make use of assisted procreation, and the
particular health risks for women undergoing ART treatment.
In light of this, it seems that law and public policy in the
context of embryo donation ought to support women’s
potential desire to have more children ahead of men’s potential
wish to procreate and also ought to favour the spouse who
seeks to procreate over a spouse who wants for the embryos to
remain in storage, be donated or destroyed.
Patients should, however, be clearly informed prior to
providing their genetic material for IVF that they will be
unable to revoke their consent to procreate. In other words,
their spouse or partner will still be able to use the embryos for
reproduction even if they change their minds. Patients should
be able to make a free and informed decision as to whether
they feel comfortable with this option; the empirical research
which calls into question individuals’ abilities to make
informed decisions prior to IVF suggests that where individuals
changed their minds it was with regard to their previously
expressed intentions regarding donation or destruction.147
It might also be argued that this approach
problematically forces individuals to be parents against their
wishes even if a substantial period of time has passed since
they gave their consent to use their reproductive material for
assisted procreation. For instance, in the Nott case discussed in
the introduction to this article, the embryos have now been in
storage for 9 years. Currently in Canada, unlike other
jurisdictions,148 there are no limitations on how long embryos
can remain in storage. Moreover, a woman may be able to use
147
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embryos for implantation up until menopause and potentially
until she reaches the age of 55.149 This means that it would be
possible for embryos to be used thirty or more years after
spouses had consented to use their genetic material for
procreation.
This issue could, however, be addressed without
preventing one spouse from using embryos for procreative
purposes. Rather, should spouses divorce and one no longer
wishes for the embryos to be used for procreation, that spouse
could be absolved of parental obligations and denied parental
rights. A number of provinces have now made clear that a
sperm donor is not a parent simply by virtue of his donation.150
A smaller number have also stipulated that egg donors and
embryo donors are similarly not to be considered legal parents,
unless this was the donors’ and the child’s parents’
intentions.151 Spouse who change their minds and do not wish
for embryos created from their sperm or ova to be used for
reproduction could be legally considered donors under the law.
In turn, British Columbia’s Family Law Act now provides that
if a child was conceived152 through the use of assisted
procreation while a couple was married or in a marriage-like
149
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relationship, the birth mother’s spouse or partner will not be
considered the child’s parent where there is evidence that he or
she did not consent to be a parent or withdrew his or her
consent prior to implantation.153 This provision similarly
demonstrates that is possible to find that a spouse should not be
held to be a legal parent despite his or her relationship with the
child’s mother and potentially despite this spouse having a
genetic connection to the child.
However, a spouse should only be absolved of parental
obligations where a substantial period of time has elapsed
between the time of the embryos’ creation and implantation.
Allowing one spouse to revoke his or her consent to be a parent
immediately or shortly after the embryos’ creation would be
troubling in light of Canadian family law legislation; where a
woman becomes pregnant and a couple divorces or separates,
the male spouse or partner will not be off the hook for child
support simply because he changed his mind. This limitation
period could be set, for instance, at 3 years or some other
length of time that is deemed appropriate to reflect the period
of time in which a couple might have attempted and
reattempted to have children using frozen embryos. And once
again, patients should be informed prior to undergoing IVF that
regardless of whether they separate, they will be held to have
parental rights and obligations with regard to any children
conceived during that time period.
Freeing unwilling parents from having parental
obligations does not stop them from having children produced
from their genes against their wishes. However, this situation is
comparable to one in which individuals decide to donate their
embryos to a third-party and then only decide to revoke their
consent after the revocation period has elapsed. It may result in
children being produced contrary to their present intentions, but
public policy and respect for women’s reproductive choices
153
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necessitates that the donors be prohibited from revoking their
consent in these instances.
In addition, agreements between spouses and fertility
clinics as to how to dispose of surplus embryos ought to be
legally unenforceable, especially if they are created prior to
successfully giving birth, or unsuccessfully completing a round
of IVF. This would recognize that spouses might not be in a
position to make free and informed decisions as to how to
dispose of their surplus embryos prior to undergoing even a
first cycle of IVF. Spouses ought to be encouraged, following
completion of their first round of IVF, to discuss and stipulate
in writing what they would like to do with their surplus
embryos and what they think should happen in the event they
divorce or disagree. But these agreements should be viewed –
similar to surrogacy agreements – as non-binding contracts that
set out the parties’ wishes, aspirations and expectations.
Consent provided by either spouse to donate or destroy their
embryos prior to undergoing IVF treatment should be
considered invalid, in the same way that a birth mother or
surrogate cannot consent to relinquish her parental rights, prior
to giving birth.
Should a disagreement arise between spouses, and
neither wishes to use the embryos for their own procreation, it
seems reasonable to create a default that the embryos should be
destroyed. Allowing for the embryos potentially to be donated
against one spouse’s wishes would be problematic in light of
the empirical research, discussed in Part I of this article,
indicating that most of the time when individuals change their
minds regarding their disposition decisions they opt to destroy
their embryos rather than donate them. Dividing them equally
among spouses could amount to treating the embryos as
property. In turn, keeping them in storage would require parties
to continue to pay annual storage fees and would also, over
time, potentially create problems for fertility clinics with regard
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to storage space.154 Moreover, destruction is the most
commonly selected option for individuals with surplus embryos
and thus is arguably a more appropriate default than
donation.155
Establishing a default of destruction would not please
everyone. Some might criticize this approach as wasting
embryos that might otherwise be used for research or which
might help a childless couple conceive. In turn, the act of
destroying embryos might be unthinkable to some donors on
account of their personal or religious beliefs. However, this
default would only come into effect should a disagreement
arise between spouses. Should they not wish for the embryos to
be destroyed they would be given the option to use them for
their own reproductive purposes.
Finally, fertility clinics should seek to mitigate
potential conflicts and power imbalances between spouses
through increased education and counselling. It would
undoubtedly be beneficial for provincial regulations to mandate
that all clinics and hospitals provide at least one counselling
session to individuals who undergo IVF, embryo implantation
and other forms of treatment involving reproductive
technologies. These clinics should also ensure that individuals
undergoing IVF are not only aware of the health risks
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associated with the procedure, but also of the laws that apply to
them with regard to embryo disposition.
This overall approach would better account for the
experiences of individuals who undergo IVF and who need to
make decisions regarding the disposition of their embryos. It
would also accord with how Canadian legislatures and courts
have responded to similar agreements or disputes between
spouses. Finally, it would better support the objectives of the
AHRA and Quebec’s Act Respecting Assisted Procreation to
promote the health and well-being of Canadians – and
especially women – who use ARTs and to ensure that
individuals who undergo treatment or who donate their genetic
materials provide free and informed consent.

